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Chapter 9:
A Multi Approach in Corruption Research:
Towards a More Comprehensive Multi-Level
Framework to Study Corruption and Its Causes
Leo W.J.C. Huberts       
1. Introduction
Corruption and causation are among the most contested concepts in (social)
science and their combination offers an intriguing as well as a seemingly un-
solvable puzzle. In this chapter, I will try to clarify some of its pieces.
The first puzzle piece concerns the characterization of corruption. It is
crucial to be clear about the actual interpretation of the corruption concept. Is
it bribing and being bribed; is it private profit from (public) power; is it un-
ethical (public) behavior? (§ 2) Second, whenever causes are debated, the
question of how causation is interpreted arises. Stemming from the literature
on power and influence, the view on causes as INUS conditions is presented.
A cause is a characteristic or condition that is an ‘Insufficient’ but ‘Neces-
sary’ part of an ‘Unnecessary’ but ‘Sufficient’ condition for the effect (§ 3).
Many conditions can lead to corruption and in research, it is essential to try to
find the element that cannot be missed among the many that together contrib-
ute to it.
A third complication and challenge is the interrelationship of many con-
ditions at different ‘analytical’ levels. We all are familiar with the micro-
meso-macro distinction. Although many researchers focus on one or two of
these levels – often because their disciplinary orientation so limits them – few
will deny that the real challenge in is (inter)relating these levels. A number of
approaches and studies will be presented with different and challenging foci
on the factors that determine corruption. First some descriptive multi-level
frameworks will be summarized (§ 4); second a number of challenging ‘lim-
ited level’ studies will be presented (§ 5). After the brief sketches of these
studies on the conditions and causes of corruption, we conclude with a first
idea about a multi-level approach or a better framework for analysis (§ 6).
Not surprisingly, it becomes clear that there is no simple way out of multi-
dilemmas. The main conclusion is nonetheless optimistic. A comprehensive
framework that relates types of corruption with a variety of factors at differ-
ent levels might help. And although we are only in the first phase, that is,
collecting and summing up what might matter, I am optimistic about using
that knowledge for overlapping theory building.
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2. Multi-Corruption
It is often stated that the corruption phenomenon is complex, complicated,
and difficult to grasp, resulting in the notion that defining corruption is more
or less a mission impossible. In my view, however, there is not so much a se-
rious conceptual problem of obscurity or complexity but primarily a matter of
disagreement between scholars and practitioners. To put it simply: interpre-
tations of what corruption vary between broad and narrow, and we can avoid
Babylonian confusion of speech by being explicit in definition and specifica-
tion.
Often ‘corruption’ is related to acting in opposition to what is considered
morally good or right (Barker/Carter 1996; Bull/Newell 2003; Caiden 1991;
Caiden/Dwivedi/Jabbra 2001; Cooper 2001; Crank/Caldero 2000; Dobel
1999; Heidenheimer/Johnston 2002; Huberts/Jurkiewicz/Maesschalck 2008;
Johnston 2005; Menzel/Carson 1999; Preston/Sampford/Connors 2002). In
other words, it is equal to violating what is considered to be in line with rele-
vant moral values and norms, equal to the violation of integrity (and rather
close to ‘improper interests involved’, when the last part is interpreted
broadly).
The interpretation is quite different from the probably most-favored defi-
nition of corruption in terms of private interest and profit from (public) office
(Lawton/Doig 2006; Menzel 2005; Pope 2000). This interpretation is wide-
spread but has to compete with an ‘even more’ specific interpretation that
concentrates on where the private profit is coming from. Is misusing office
for private profit always corruption or is it conditional whether there is a third
party involved? If so, we are concentrating on bribing and other types of im-
proper influence (active and passive); if not, all types of theft, fraud, and
misuse of resources are included.
In VU research, a broad typology of integrity violations is used. It was
originally formulated through an analysis of the literature on (police) integ-
rity and corruption and later adapted and validated (Lasthuizen 2008) based
on empirical research on internal police force investigations. The typology
explicitly incorporates violations of law as well as of (informal) moral norms
and values, violations in function within the organization, private time
(mis)behavior, behavior serving private personal interests, and misbehavior
in favor of the organization (‘noble cause corruption’) (Lamboo 2005).
Among the types of integrity violation are corruption (bribing and favor-
itism)1, fraud, theft, conflict of interest through gifts, conflict of interest
                                                          
1 Thus, only bribing and favoritism explicitly use the corruption label. Corruption as bribing
involves the abuse of powers for private gain, coming from an interested third actor (because
of advantages promised or given). In corruption as favoritism, the advantages promised or
given to the corrupt functionary can take the form of indirect personal gains, such as when
family or close friends (nepotism), friends or peers (cronyism), or a party or one’s own or-
ganisation (patronage) are favoured.
Leo W.J.C. Huberts148
through jobs, improper use of authority, misuse and manipulation of infor-
mation, indecent treatment of colleagues or citizens and customers (including
discrimination and sexual harassment), waste and abuse of organizational re-
sources, and private time misconduct. To distinguish between them is im-
portant, especially when discussing the causes of ‘corruption’. It seems plau-
sible that corruption as ‘bribing’ will not be caused by the same factors as
other corruption-related violations (favoritism, fraud, conflict of interest, and
so on), let alone other types of violation (for example, waste and abuse of re-
sources and private time misconduct).
Focus
This chapter will concentrate on corruption with an interpretation used by
other authors in this book, that is, corruption as the abuse of a (public)
authority for private benefit. This is more or less in line with Michael
Johnston’s definition of corruption as ‘the abuse, according to the legal or so-
cial standards constituting a society’s system of public order, of a public role
or resource for private benefit’ (1996: 322). More specifically, this means
that the following elements of the typology are incorporated:
1. Bribing: Misuse of (public) power for private gain: asking, offering, ac-
cepting bribes.
2. Favoritism: Misuse of authority to favor family, friends or party (nepo-
tism, cronyism, patronage).
3. Fraud and theft: Improper private gain from the organization, colleagues,
or citizens without an interested external actor.
4. Conflict of (private and public) interest through gifts, services, assets, or
promises taken.
5. Conflict of (private and public) interest through sideline activities (jobs,
position, activities).
Conclusion
It seems important to realize that future research will have to differentiate
more clearly between types of violations, but for now it is most important
that we are clear about the phenomenon we are addressing. I will from this
point focus on corruption as the abuse of a (public) authority for private
benefit. In terms of the integrity violations typology, it means that it includes
bribing, favoritism, conflicts of interest, and fraud and theft. But please, keep
in mind that when we concentrate on corruption as improper private profit
from public power, we should not then over exaggerate the relevance of re-
sults for the causes of other types of integrity violations.
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3. Multi-Level Causation
Causation is in a sense a more complex and disputed concept than corruption.
Its content is essential for much of the work of social scientists, whatever
their field. We all agree that ‘correlation is not causation’ and that co-
variation as such is only a starting point for attempts to come to conclusions
about cause and effect relationships. But what are the characteristics of a re-
lationship that enables us to conclude it is a causal one? First it is important
to be specific about the effect that is analyzed in order to establish causes.
Second it is conditional that cause and effect both have occurred; that cause
and effect are distinct ‘events’; that, in the circumstances, if the cause had not
occurred the effect would not have occurred; and that cause is prior to the ef-
fect.
Very strict interpretations of causality then imply that we only speak of
the cause of an effect when the cause is necessary and sufficient for the ef-
fect, but this does not bring us much further in trying to understand the di-
verse and complex corruption phenomena we see in society. More often, a
combination of conditions and circumstances seem to contribute to the effect
or result, a corrupt person, regime, or organization.
A way out seems to be Mackie’s idea to about ‘INUS conditions’ meaning
‘Insufficient’ but ‘Necessary’ part of an ‘Unnecessary’ but ‘Sufficient’ condi-
tion for the effect (Mackie 1965, 1974). Mackie stressed that effects have, typi-
cally, a plurality of causes. That is, a certain effect can be brought about by a
number of distinct clusters of factors. Each cluster is sufficient to bring about
the effect, but none of them is necessary. Each single factor is an insufficient
but non-redundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition for the effect.
In other words, trying to find out more about the causes of corruption
means trying to discover conglomerates of conditions that actually have led
to cases of corruption. When there is corruption, there is by definition a set of
sufficient conditions present. The next step is to disentangle the conglomer-
ate, trying to find out what conditions seem to be most prominent or neces-
sary or in INUS terms non-redundant.
Multi-Level
Another aspect of any approach is taking into account at which level corrup-
tion manifests itself and is analyzed. The common distinction between levels
is that of micro (the individual), meso (group, organization), and macro (so-
ciety).
Many scholars see the macro-meso-micro problem as hard to solve and
many discussions on the importance of causal factors for corruption stem from
researchers’ involvement with different levels. Sometimes this is done by
eclectic mapping of whatever is mentioned as a cause in (part of the) literature.
Other examples concern researchers who consciously try to combine multi-
level factors in empirical studies.
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4. Eclectic Mapping of Causes
My first rather limited attempt to do international comparative research on
the causes of ‘public corruption and fraud’ started with a literature review
(Alatas 1990; Benaissa 1993; Caiden 1988; Van Duyne 1995; Heiden-
heimer/Johnston/Levine 1989; Hoetjes 1982; Huberts 1992; Klitgaard 1988;
Wertheim/Brasz 1960). It resulted in a typology of social, economic, politi-
cal, organizational, and individual factors mentioned in the literature as pos-
sible causes of corruption and fraud.
The starting point for that typology of factors was the ‘ecological ap-
proach’ of Ben Hoetjes, a Dutch pioneer in this field, who worked on devel-
opment administration (primarily India) and on corruption in the Netherlands
(1977, 1982, 1998, 2000). Hoetjes distinguished between four disciplinary
approaches or clusters of relevant factors and causes (1977: 53-65).2 The first
‘Weberian approach’ sees corruption as a lack of rationalization of the public
service and corruption is a phase on the route from patrimonialism to rational
legal authority. Second is the structural functionalist approach. Which func-
tion fulfills corruption in a certain society? Is it for example the lubricant
between the central and the local levels or between state and business levels?
Or does corruption provide protection and influence for social groups with
material wealth but little or no political influence? (Riggs 1964). The third
approach, institutional economics, sees corrupt officials as rational utility
maximizers who simply take the most profitable course of action. It favors
perceiving ‘individuals as rational beings attempting to further their own self-
interest in a world of scarce resources’ (Rose-Ackerman 1978: 4) and is also
interested in the conditions that determine a profitable course, including the
discretionary power of an actor and the expected costs of accepting a bribe
(Rose-Ackerman 1999, 2006).
Hoetjes favored another approach to corruption that he called ecological,
which concerns distinguishing the environment that furthers corruption
(Hoetjes 1977: 60-65; Hoetjes 1982: 72-76). In his framework, many social,
economic, and political factors are identified, but he does not limit himself to
the environment or an ‘ecological orientation’. He added many personal and
organizational characteristics. The following set of causes can be derived
from his work:
– Individual and personal factors: personal experiences, feelings of insecu-
rity, personal identity, moral ambivalence
– Informal group factors within the organization: group or clique propensity
to corrupt, informal group leadership, relationships with colleagues
– Formal organization: unclear tasks and responsibilities, lack of central
authority, semi-publicness (between public and private), uncontrolled
                                                          
2 See also chapter 1 of this book.
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growth of the organization, demoralizing working conditions, contradic-
tions between organizational circumstances and social expectations
– Society as a whole: social inequality, rapid social change, norms and val-
ues, apathy and ignorance, distrust
– Economy: poverty and inequality, inflation, sudden influx of external re-
sources, state intervention in economic life, state monopolies, feelings of
injustice concerning economic conditions
– Politics: increasing (party) political influence and de-bureaucratization,
lack of democracy, lack of openness and public debate (also via the me-
dia).
It seems fruitful to reinterpret Hoetjes’ four approaches in terms of questions
on the causes of corruption. Weberians see the relationship between politics
and administration as the key factor (including the quality and independence
of the civil service) and ‘economists’ point to motives of the involved actors
(individuals in particular) and their self-interest. Functionalists point to posi-
tive effects for the functioning of the system to explain the persistent pres-
ence of corruption, but they are not specific on the causes (more in general:
the interests of the political and economic actors). Ecologists add that context
is crucial and characteristics of society, politics, law, economy, technology,
and culture have to be taken into account.
Figure 1: Hoetjes’ Corruption Approaches: Weberian, functionalist,
economics and ecological
Hoetjes’ impressive inventory of factors may serve as a starting point, but a
number of clarifications, changes and additions seem necessary to make the
framework (more) useful for and appealing to corruption researchers. First,
we have to take into account that the inventory was in part based on personal
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impressions, which makes it rather random. State-of-the-art theory and re-
search will have to be built in. Leadership characteristics, for example, are
nowadays often seen as important to explaining and understanding corrup-
tion, but they are only impressionistically mentioned (Ciulla 2002;
Lasthuizen 2008; Treviño et al. 1999). Second, its seems wise to reinterpret
the four approaches by including all the mentioned factors on the micro (mo-
tives and circumstances), meso (organization) and macro (society) levels as
possible causes of corruption. Third, it should be clearer that the corruption
phenomenon to be explained manifests itself at different levels and thus
causes and effects can be so situated and analyzed. Are we interested in indi-
vidual, organizational or (social, political, economic) systemic corruption?
Expert Panel Views
When so many factors at different levels seem to contribute to corruption, an
obvious question is what really matters (most). More than a decade ago, I
carried out some research on the importance of a variety of multi-level causes
of corruption (Huberts 1996, 1998). Twenty social, economic, political, or-
ganizational, and individual factors from the literature were selected as pos-
sible causes of public corruption and fraud (defined as the misuse of public
power for private gain). An international expert panel was surveyed by mail
about the extent of their nation’s public corruption and fraud, the causal con-
ditions, and the methods and strategies they considered to be effective com-
batants. (Huberts 1998). A total of 257 respondents from 49 countries an-
swered the questions, 190 from higher and 67 from lower income countries.3
The panel was asked to indicate the importance of 20 factors, including social
(inequality, norms and values, crime), economic, political, organizational
(culture, structure, leadership) and individual (norms and values, income)
factors. Table 1 summarizes the results.
                                                          
3 75 respondents from Western Europe, 4 from Eastern Europe, 65 from Asia, 14 from Oce-
ania, 55 from North America, 37 from Latin America and 7 from Africa. ‘Higher income
countries’ and ‘lower income countries’ were distinguished on the basis of the GNP per
capita (GNP per capita > $6,000 = higher income country).
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Table 1: Importance of Multi-Factors for Corruption in
(Lower and Higher Income) Countries
Factors
(very) important cause of public corruption
or fraud in own country
higher
income
countries
(n=190)
lower
income
countries
(n=67)
total
panel
(n=257)
social factors
? increasing strength of organized crime
? social inequality
? rapid social change
? strong family ties and obligations
? social norms and values concerning private and public
(rights and duties)
? values and norms concerning government and state offi-
cials and organizations
economic factors
? economic problems: inflation/recession
? fast economic growth
political factors
? growth and size of government organization
? strong interrelationships: politics and administration
? strong interrelationships: business, politics, state
? penetration of market ideology in the state
? increasing significance of lobbying
organizational factors: culture
? public sector culture (values/norms)
? lack of commitment of leadership (/giving bad example)
organizational factors: structure
? misorganization and mismanagement
? lack of control, supervision, auditing
? computerization of administrative procedures
individual factors
? norms and values of individual politicians and public ser-
vants
? low salaries in the public sector
79.3%
66.7%
64.7%
52.4%
78.0%
84.6%
62.2%
51.4%
60.0%
67.0%
86.8%
47.1%
76.5%
83.3%
82.2%
80.7%
87.2%
31.4%
88.4%
56.9%
90.0%
90.2%
81.4%
61.4%
73.7%
79.7%
85.2%
67.3%
72.9%
86.4%
92.9%
43.9%
72.9%
76.8%
90.2%
91.9%
93.3%
30.4%
98.4%
87.1%
82.0%
72.8%
69.0%
54.6%
76.9%
83.3%
68.0%
55.3%
63.2%
71.8%
88.3%
46.3%
75.6%
81.8%
84.2%
83.5%
88.8%
31.1%
90.9%
64.6%
According to the experts a conglomerate of causal factors was important to
explaining cases of public corruption and fraud in their country. Not surpris-
ingly, some factors related to developmental problems were considered more
important by respondents from lower income countries. These factors were
‘social inequality’, ‘low salaries in the public sector’, and ‘economic prob-
lems: inflation/recession’. The simple message here was that policies against
poverty and underdevelopment would contribute to establishing more integ-
rity in the public sector.
At the same time, there was much more agreement on the importance of
causes in differing contexts than expected. The three most important were
identical for higher and lower income countries, and most of the other most
important causes of corruption in higher income countries were important in
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lower income countries as well. In all parts of the world, rich or poor, cor-
ruption and fraud were associated with (1) the values and norms of individual
politicians and civil servants, (2) the lack of commitment to public integrity
of leadership, (3) organizational problems and failures (lack of control and
supervision and mismanagement), (4) the relationship between the public
sector and business, and (5) the increasing strength of organized crime.
What to think of these results? What is the use of presenting the aged
views of an expert panel in a new book on the causes of corruption? I of
course agree that the account presented is by definition questionable: the data
are empirically limited and the work is poor on theory. The research none-
theless shows that experts can combine and relate causal factors at different
levels in an analysis of corruption in their own countries. This makes me op-
timistic about the possibility of a comprehensive multi-level framework and
of moving forward, empirically and theoretically.
An important question then is whether the many ensuing studies on the
causes of corruption justify that optimism. The next section presents a selection
of that important work with studies on the macro, meso, and micro levels.
5. Multi-Studies on the Causes of Corruption
Introduction
In this section we summarize a number of studies on the causes of corruption,
concentrating first on macro level research, followed by meso and micro
studies. The sketch is meant to be illustrative, not at all pretending to select
the best studies nor present the state of the art.4
Macro Studies of Causes of Corruption
Two of the most quoted and famous contributions on the causes of corruption
are that of Treisman (2000) and Lambsdorff (2005).5 Both researchers focus
on the macro level, analyzing many countries and taking into account a lim-
ited number of primarily macro characteristics. Later, both authors reviewed
the enormous body of literature in their field that was published in the last
decade. Most of these studies use corruption perception data to assess cor-
ruption levels across countries. Many surveys ask businesspeople, citizens,
analysts and others to estimate the amount of corruption in countries (defined
in terms of the ‘abuse of power for personal gains’) and these data are com-
bined into indexes. Most often data from Transparency International or the
World Bank (Kaufmann et al. 2007) are used.
                                                          
4 I also immediately acknowledge that I lean on studies familiar to me, in particular the work
of a number of esteemed VU colleagues.
5 Treisman (2000) with 891 hits on Google scholar and Lambsdorff (1999) at a distance sec-
ond with 163 hits (20-Jan-2009).
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Based on his review of the wave of empirical studies in 2005, Lambsdorff
concluded that corruption clearly correlates with a low Gross Domestic Prod-
uct (GDP), income inequality, inflation, crime, policy distortions and lack of
competition. The direction of causality for these indicators, however, is con-
troversial. ‘Corruption may cause these variables but is at the same time
likely to be their consequence as well’ (2005: 27).
The general idea is that countries can be trapped in a vicious circle where
corruption lowers income, increases inequality, inflation, crime and policy
distortions, and helps monopolies at the expense of competition. These de-
velopments in turn escalate corruption. Lambsdorff adds that not all empiri-
cal results were consistent with his expectations on the causes of corruption:
‘For example, the disciplining and motivating effect of higher official wages was found to
be rather limited. Also the impact of colonialism on corruption was ambiguous. Press free-
dom and the (de facto) independence of the judiciary and prosecutors appeared to be im-
portant elements in reducing corruption. Increased corruption also resulted from compli-
cated regulation of market entry and tariffs. Corruption was found to increase with the
abundance of natural resources and with the distance to the major trading centers. How-
ever, these two latter results provide no direction for reform. The same is largely true of
cultural dimensions. In particular, a mentality of accepting hierarchies was found to in-
crease corruption.
Democracy obtained the expected positive impact on absence of corruption. However, this
impact was more complex. Only countries with high levels of democracy, or electoral sys-
tems with high rates of participation, are able to reduce corruption. Medium levels of de-
mocracy can even increase corruption. The effect of democracy is also not immediate but
takes decades rather than years. Thus, democracy reduces corruption in the long run, but
not the lukewarm type of democracy’ (2005: 27).
Another central scholar in this field, Daniel Treisman, reflected on the state
of the art in 2007 in ‘What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corrup-
tion from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?’ Treisman re-
viewed the efforts by political scientists and economists to explain cross-
national variations in corruption using subjective ratings, and examined the
robustness of reported findings (2007: 241):
‘We now know that states are perceived by business people and their citizens to be less
corrupt if they are highly developed, long-established liberal democracies, with a free and
widely read press, a high share of women in government, and a long record of openness to
international trade. Countries are perceived to be more corrupt if they depend on fuel ex-
ports, have intrusive business regulations, and suffer from unpredictable inflation.’
But like Lambsdorff, Treisman is skeptical about the causality of the relation-
ships. We cannot reliably say that most of these factors cause corruption per-
ceptions to be high or low, he states, although evidence of this is strongest for
economic development. Very important is that Treisman compares percep-
tion data on corruption with information on actual experiences of corruption.
The United Nations Crime Victims’ survey, the World Business Environment
Survey and Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer, for ex-
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ample, offer measures of how frequently citizens or business people encounter
demands for bribes in different countries. Treisman concludes (2007: 211):
‘Quite strong evidence suggests that highly developed, long-established liberal democracies,
with a free and widely read press, a high share of women in government, and a history of
openness to trade, are perceived as less corrupt. Countries that depend on fuel exports or have
intrusive business regulations and unpredictable inflation are judged more corrupt. Although
the causal direction is usually unclear, instrumenting with income as of 1700 suggests higher
development does cause lower perceived corruption. However, controlling for income, most
factors that predict perceived corruption do not correlate with recently available measures of
actual corruption experiences (based on surveys of business people and citizens that ask
whether they have been expected to pay bribes recently). Reported corruption experiences
correlate with lower development, and possibly with dependence on fuel exports, lower trade
openness, and more intrusive regulations. The subjective data may reflect opinion rather than
experience, and future research could usefully focus on experience-based indicators.’
Meso and Micro Studies of Corruption
Many studies on corruption and integrity at the meso and micro levels also
pay attention to the causes of corruption. To illustrate the line of reasoning
and empirical results, I will summarize a number of studies of the VU re-
search group Integrity of Governance that address the relationship between
cases of corruption and characteristics of the involved individuals and or-
ganization(s).
Lasthuizen (2008) investigated the relationship between leadership and
integrity violations in organizations via empirical work within a Dutch police
force. The research defined, conceptualized, and empirically operationalized
distinct notions of (ethical) leadership and integrity violation types, as well as
the mediating factors of ethical culture and moral judgment. Corruption ap-
peared to be a complex as well as very partial phenomenon among the integ-
rity violations the police is confronted with (Table 2). Corruption and fraud
in terms of bribing, favoritism (by supervisors and employees), fraud and
theft, and conflicts of interests were distinguished.
One finding was that the respondents perceived most types of integrity
violations seldom occurred in the direct work environment and judged them
unacceptable practices. However, the responses also suggested that favorit-
ism by supervisors, fraud, indecent treatment of colleagues and customers,
and waste and abuse may be more widespread, an observation that, for fraud,
coincides with a milder moral judgment (i.e., fewer respondents find this
violation unacceptable).
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Table 2: Moral Judgments on and Observed Frequency of Integrity Viola-
tions in the Police
Types of integrity violations Observed frequency
percentage
“never”
Acceptability
percentage
“never acceptable”
Corruption: bribing 96% 98%
Corruption: favoritism by supervisors 51% 64%
Corruption: favoritism by employees 80% 78%
Fraud 25% 25%
Theft 82% 96%
Conflict of interest through gifts 72% 60%
Conflict of interest through jobs 83% 57%
Improper use of authority 78% 83%
Misuse and manipulation of information 84% 89%
Discrimination against colleagues 85% 96%
Sexual harassment of colleagues 92% 99%
Indecent treatment of colleagues 54% 72%
Indecent treatment of customers 58% 80%
Waste and abuse 60% 85%
Private time misconduct 73% 71%
What caused these integrity violations? Lasthuizen focused on leadership types
as possible causes or explanations of what went wrong. She concluded that,
contrary to the assumptions prevalent in the literature, leadership is neither a
Eureka concept nor a panacea. Rather, the influence of the relationship between
leadership and the incidence and prevalence of integrity violations primarily
works indirectly through the ethical culture and employee moral judgments.
Only a few direct effects were established. Specifically, positive direct effects
(i.e., the limiting of integrity violations) were found for inspirational leadership
on favoritism by supervisors; and for role-modeling leadership on bribing, fa-
voritism by supervisors, and private time misconduct. However, negative direct
effects (i.e., the allowing of integrity violations) were observed for passive
leadership on waste and abuse, for integrity-focused leadership on discrimina-
tion against colleagues, and for unethical leadership on favoritism by supervi-
sors and manipulation and misuse of information.
Employee moral judgment appeared to be an important factor for limiting
the incidence and prevalence of integrity violations. If employees find a spe-
cific type of integrity violation unacceptable, fewer integrity violations of
that type will occur. Employee moral judgments can be influenced by the
ethical leadership styles of role-modeling and integrity-focused leadership.
Lasthuizen presented AMOS models to illustrate the various indirect paths
along which these total effects were reached (dependent on type of integrity
violation). Figure 2 presents the results on bribing.6 The arrows represent the
effect of the independent and intermediate variables on the dependent vari-
                                                          
6 Covariances were permitted between all leadership styles, as the correlational analysis has
shown that the leadership styles intercorrelate significantly.
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able, while the numbers represent the effect size; only significant standard-
ized betas are included.
To summarize: inspirational leadership causes bribing to be more (!)
prominent; result-oriented leadership is much less influential; role modeling
and integrity-focused leadership help to limit bribing.
Figure 2: Leadership Styles and Bribing
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Nature of Corruption
Another example of a study on the causes of corruption at the meso and mi-
cro levels is De Graaf’s work on the nature of corruption in the Netherlands.
The project was part of a broader study on corruption (Huberts/Nelen 2005).
Definitionally, ‘public officials are corrupt when they act (or fail to act) as a
result of receiving personal rewards from interested outside parties’. De
Graaf studied ten Dutch corruption cases in depth (De Graaf/Huberts 2008).
The confidential criminal case files, which included taped telephone conver-
sations, official reports, suspect interrogations, and witness interviews, were
studied thoroughly along with all available public sources such as newspaper
articles and court records. Fifteen interviews were held with the respective
case detectives and their superiors to glean as much as possible about the ac-
cused officials and their organizational context. Where possible, the proposi-
tions were compared with existing literature on the nature of corruption.
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The research findings on the nature of corruption derived from the ten
cases concerned (1) the individual corrupt official, (2) his or her organiza-
tional context, and (3) the relationship between the briber and corrupt official
(De Graaf/Huberts 2008). Among the conclusions and propositions were:
1. Next to material gain, the most important motives for officials to become
corrupt are friendship (or love), status, and making an impression on col-
leagues and friends.
2. Officials ‘slide’ toward corruption; most processes of becoming corrupt
can be considered a slippery slope.
3. Corruption rarely evolves from personal problems – financial, for exam-
ple – of the official. In no case studied here was there a conscious cost-
benefit calculation as to whether to accept bribes or not. In almost every
case, the process of becoming corrupt can be characterized as a gradual
one, a slippery slope.
4. Often, corrupt officials have dominant and strong personalities, know
how to ‘get things done’, take or get the freedom to do things independ-
ently, and overstep formal boundaries of authority. The more the public
official is a ‘business type’, the higher the risk of corruption.
5. In most corruption cases, supervision of the corrupt official is not strong.
In each of the criminal files of the ten cases, complaints were found about
the direct superior’s or the organization’s executives’ failing to supervise
the corrupt official.
6. In most corruption cases, management had not promoted a clear integrity
policy. Integrity was not an issue.
7. Because of loyalty and solidarity, colleagues are hesitant to report suspi-
cions of another’s corrupt activities. Signals of something ‘irregular’ sur-
faced before the corruption case was discovered; the signals, however,
were not properly handled.
8. The relationship between briber and the official is most often enduring.
The firmness of the relationships between the corrupt officials and their
bribers is notable.
9. Corrupt officials, including those who operate external ‘corrupt net-
works’, do not limit their corruption to one incident.
Bad Apples, Bad Barrels
Whether misbehavior and corruption is more a function of bad apples (per-
sonal characteristics) or bad barrels (organizational and societal variables) is
constantly debated in the literature. The evidence of the sketched multiple
case-study supports the argument of many social researchers (cf. Kish-
Gephart et al. 2010; Vardi/Weitz 2004) that (1) neither the individual nor the
organizational perspectives fully explain corruption, and (2) integrative ex-
planations are the most useful to explain corrupt behavior (De Graaf 2007).
So we need the combination of meso and micro, but what about macro?
The studies presented in the previous paragraph illuminated the importance
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of macro characteristics (as wealth, culture, democracy and the judicial sys-
tem) for the amount of corruption in a country. Should the metaphor of bad
apples and bad barrels be systematically completed by paying attention to
bad trees and bad orchards?
6. Conclusion and Discussion
Let me open for discussion and future research a number of concluding obser-
vations on a possible multi-approach in the study (of the causes) of corruption.
1. Reflection about the causes of corruption should start with a definition of
corruption.
We can work with many interpretations of the phenomenon, but clarity is
crucial. In this chapter, corruption was defined in terms of private profit from
public power. Corruption then includes types of behavior such as bribing, fa-
voritism, fraud, and conflict of interest.
2. Explaining corruption demands being explicit about the explanandum.
When the definition of corruption used is clear (private profit for public
power), it is also important to be specific about the explanandum. What ‘ef-
fect’ are we trying to explain? Are we interested in the causes of one specific
corruption case? Do we want to know what caused individual X, organization
Y, or party Z to become corrupt? Or is our interest more general, looking for
what causes individuals, organizations, parties, policy sectors, countries to
become corrupt? And if so, what type of corruption is the explanandum? Is
the focus on ‘grand corruption’ by elites in politics and administration
(Moody Stuart 1997) or ‘petty corruption’ by street-level bureaucrats?
The answers will vary with the chosen research question, including the
selected ‘effect’. When a police officer falls in love with a criminal, and ‘ex-
changes’ confidential information for love, the cause of the case clearly has
to do with that characteristic. No love, no corruption. It is also clear, how-
ever, that love is much less important to a more general explanation of the
corruption of individuals (let alone organizations and countries).
It is worthwhile to explain all types of corruption (cases). The more spe-
cific to the more general can be the topic of our research, but they require dif-
ferent frameworks of (micro, meso, and macro) factors that might be causally
relevant.
3. Reflecting on the cause of corruption (of a person, case, organization,
sector, country) presupposes taking into account a multitude of factors on
different levels.
A starting point for theoretical progress should be that all actual specific
cases of corruption are related to micro, meso, and macro level characteris-
tics and circumstances or causes.
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Even in the most specific cases of individual corruption, the influence of
multi-level causes can easily be recognized. Research has shown the impor-
tance of the lack of supervision and the absence of integrity policies, clearly
meso in character, but they will depend heavily on macro characteristics. In
the Netherlands, for example, government organizations are obliged by law
to formulate and evaluate integrity policies. On the opposite side of the spec-
trum, macro studies on the level of corruption in countries include variables
such as the salaries of public servants and the percentage of women in gov-
ernment.
Additionally we have to realize that all analyses of corruption will thus
have to take into account the interrelatedness of causal factors at different
levels. When we reflect on the causes of a specific case, the organizational
context matters (structure, culture, leadership, policy) as well the broader so-
cietal context, including the public’s moral values and norms. These factors
or causes are, of course, also related.
4. Conglomerates of factors matter at all levels, but not all factors matter.
Reflecting on the cause of corruption presupposes an idea of the necessary or
most influential factors among a collection of conditions that appear to be
leading to corruption.
It is easy to state that ‘factors at all levels matter’, but how can we prevent
getting lost in a complex mix of multi-level causes of corruption amidst an
infinite number of potentially relevant aspects and characteristics at the mi-
cro, meso, and macro levels (and their interrelationships). Selection is inevi-
table. What among the many relevant factors is really necessary in an ever-
complex context with many contributing factors?
Theories can provide information and expectations about the causes as
well as the causal mechanism (how cause brings about effect). Many chapters
in this book show how a theoretical framework can lead to a number of pos-
sibly relevant causes (leaving out many others). The specificity is under-
standable; it brings focus and understanding. The offered explanations, how-
ever, are often limited.
Another line of reasoning takes the results from empirical work as a
starting point to come to the conglomerate of factors to take into account. Re-
sults are collected, analyzed and combined, and detached from their theoreti-
cal embeddings. This might lead to conclusions and hypotheses to be tested
in further research. This eclectic approach may start at the different analytical
levels, micro-meso-macro, as I try in the brief summary of factors that fol-
lows. A next step should concentrate on establishing a framework that ex-
plicitly relates factors proven to be significant at the personal, group, organ-
izational, and national levels.
5. What matters: individual and micro.
At the individual and personal levels several characteristics are important.
The studies presented and existing multi-level frameworks have shown that
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character matters: strong personalities receive more bribes. Emotion can be
crucial too: falling in love makes us vulnerable. Neither can the economic
circumstances of the (public) functionary be ignored. If corruption is the only
strategy of ‘economic survival’, the result seems obvious unless the depend-
ency is contradicted by his or her personal and group values. These values are
directly related to the functionary’s general ideas about being treated right or
wrong (in the organization and in society). The resulting view on the accept-
ability of unethical behavior (including corruption) is an important interme-
diary factor explaining the resulting behavior.
6. What matters: work, group, organization, meso.
The type of work matters, which is often related to characteristics of the or-
ganization. At the group and organizational level the behavior and opinions
of direct colleagues and supervisors are influential as well as the content of
the job in terms of the power to decide about others. Discretion is conditional
to deciding because of inappropriate interests. This is directly related to the
type of function, the type of (durable) contacts with the outside world and the
embeddedness in a stable trustful network.
Within the organization important causes of corruption are lack of control
and supervision, failing (ethical) leadership, and a culture with values and
norms justifying or even demanding corruption. Failing policy on corruption
and integrity matters as well.
7. What matters: system, country, macro.
At the country level crucial factors seem to be the level and stability of eco-
nomic (under)development, the dependency on (fuel) exports, the relation-
ship between state and business, the social norms and values (perceived fair-
ness of the system), characteristics of the system of democratic accountability
(including press freedom and citizen participation) and, importantly, the
strength of the judicial system. Of course, these interrelate with factors men-
tioned that cause corruption at the individual and group levels.
8. Multi-types of causes.
Table 3 summarizes important individual, organizational and system factors,
which without exception belong to the agenda of the broad community of re-
searchers dealing with the causes of corruption. The framework nonetheless
sends a message to the many researchers involved in studying a limited seg-
ment of it.
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Table 3: Multi-Types of Corruption Causes
Individual
Character/personality, private economic circumstances, personal values (moral judgment), emotions,
discontent
Individual and work-related
Type of work, colleagues, relationships and (trustful) network, discretion, operational leader(ship)
Organizational
– Structure: lacking control/supervision, separation of responsibilities, discretion
– Culture: goals/mission, values and norms (informal and formal) on corruption, ethics
– Policies: integrity policy, reward system
– Failing leadership: operational, strategic
Environmental
Economic (high-low income; openness and trade)
Political-administrative (state-business, politics-bureaucracy)
Judicial (the system, rule of law)
Societal (norms and values, feelings of injustice, crime)
9. Multi-approach.
The real challenge results from the necessity to build theories that combine
the many multi-level factors in an interconnected framework for understand-
ing corruption. Let me end with the presentation of a very preliminary ex-
planatory framework of the types of causes of corruption.
Corruption in countries is first related to political, economic, and social
macro circumstances with, at the core, the idea that the amount of corruption
in a country will depend on the perceived fairness of the existing polity,
economy, and society. When parts of the population do not get their ‘fair’
share of the benefits in terms of power and wealth, private profit from public
power becomes a justifiable way of life. This is true for countries poor and
rich. The idea of fairness might be expected to coincide with the morals of
citizens, including their views on the acceptability of corrupt behavior.
Not all organizations and individuals will become corrupt, however; what
they do is influenced by the macro social, economic, and political context.
Organizational and individual factors also matter.
Political and bureaucratic corruption can be limited or stimulated by meso
factors. The closer the organizational relationships between politicians and
bureaucrats and between those functionaries and business, the higher the
public corruption and the more corrupt the country. One aspect of the rela-
tionship is organizations and sectors having something ‘to offer’ (business
sectors such as fuel and construction seem important). Another is what the
organizational policy and leadership in words and deeds signal to the individ-
ual and the group about the acceptability of corruption. If corruption is ac-
cepted practice throughout the organization, the individual or group cannot
be expected to behave differently. However, having leaders and policies ex-
press the importance of ethics and integrity is no guarantee for similar micro
behavior. Some will still become corrupt because of private circumstances
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(love, finances), character and values (personal motives and views on cor-
ruption), and opportunity (risk of discovery, sanctions expected as well as
work discretion and nature of the services). Being dissatisfied with the or-
ganization seems very important in this respect.
Many individual and organizational factors are also characteristics of the
macro or country level. A country’s culture can be more or less individualistic,
repressive, or tolerant; a country’s systems of political, bureaucratic, private, and
business organizations can be more or less interconnected and tight, rely more or
less on compliance and sanctions or on integrity and values, give employees
more or less discretion, and so on. Research on the corruptness of countries of-
ten ignores such types of ‘macro’ characteristics, which is a pity. In that sense,
the criticism of many micro-meso researchers that macro researchers ignore the
‘real’ context of actual corruption (cases) is correct. We need to become more
sensitive to consequences of multi-level interplay on the research that is done.
However, this is also true for the criticasters. When micro-meso researchers
picture the causes of a specific corruption case, they often ignore the broader
macro context. Politics, culture, economics do matter and are often reflected in
a specific ‘context’ of behavior. What we lack are comparative case studies in
different countries on the amount and character of corruption. Micro studies are
too ‘local’; macro studies too monotonous in the variables studied.
The interrelationship between causes at different levels will have to be ex-
plored further. To conclude this chapter, I summarize a first general idea for the
direction of that exploration. Each level of analysis seems to have some very
specific factors, causes, conditions, or variables but a number of related areas
could be given more attention. Table 4 summarizes the argument.
Table 4: Multi-Approach for Further Research
Type
of factor
Level
Culture
Values
Economics Political / or-
ganization
Policy: com-
pliance and
integrity
Injustice
Discontent
Other
factors
Macro /
national
social
values
culture
economic
situation
state-busi-
ness
politics-ad-
ministration
politics-so-
ciety (net-
works)
judicial sys-
tem;
law;
integrity
policy
feelings of
injustice
social discon-
tent
crime
Meso /
organiza-
tional
organiza-
tional val-
ues, cul-
ture
reward sys-
tem
control sys-
tem
job discre-
tion
leadership
norms and
sanctions
leadership
integrity pol-
icy
discontent in
organization
reward sys-
tem
policy sector
Micro /
individual
personal
values,
moral
judgment
personal
financial
situation
relationships
(internal, ex-
ternal)
type of work
moral judg-
ment
risk of pun-
ishment
individual dis-
content and
frustration
(society,
work, job)
character
emotions
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Individual character, personality, and emotions seem rather specific but may
be related to the broader culture. The personal values and moral judgment are
almost by definition related to and influenced by organizational and social
values and the same is apparent for the personal economic or financial situa-
tion, the organizational reward system, and the state of the economy. Factors
stemming from the political and organizational structure also find their
counterparts in characteristics as the relationships at work and the amount of
discretion of the individual (and the group). Very important and under re-
searched is the relationship between feelings of injustice and frustration at
the different levels.
Two last additional remarks are important. First, the mechanisms and
conditions causing corruption should of course not be limited to the columns
in the table. Values and culture, economics, politics and social structure are
interrelated and causes of corruption will entail different dimensions.
Second, the selection of types of factors obviously depends on the spe-
cific question that we are trying to answer. The explanation of an individual
case of corruption asks for another set of factors than the explanation of the
amount of corruption of a country. What the Multi Approach adds is the need
for more sensitivity concerning the multi-level and multi-factor character of
causal relationships. A more comprehensive framework might contribute to
our understanding of the complex corruption phenomenon as well as help to
connect the different approaches sketched in this book.
